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Abstract: The evaluation of certain decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and of certain 
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In the opinion of some magistrates of the European Court, “the freedom of 
religion” – that the European Convention on Human Rights (acc. to art. 9) 
expressly mentions – is one and the same with „the freedom of worship” (Bîrsan, 
2005, p. 707); in fact, the latter is only an external manifestation expressed through 
a public testimony of faith and through a liturgical ritual or an ensemble of 
religious ceremonies.  
Therefore, it is of no surprise that, in the opinion of these magistrates, the freedom 
of conscience “be situated” between “the freedom of thought” – manifested as 
freedom of opinion – and „the freedom of worship”, which, indeed, “can neither 
overlap the freedom of opinion, as a freedom recognised to any individual … to 
express certain convictions, that is the freedom of any man to think and to express 
what he thinks is true, nor the freedom of worship, which signifies the right of any 
man to openly exercise a certain religious cult, according to his faith; …” (Bîrsan, 
2005, p. 707). 
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The European Court stipulated – with the value of a principle – that „the 
participation to the life of the religious community represents a manifestation of 
religion, protected by the provisions of art. 9 of the Convention” (Bîrsan, 2005, p. 712). 
But, how did the European Court perceive and define Religion and the religious 
Cult?! 
Magistrates of the European Court recognise that “... neither the Convention, nor 
the jurisprudence of its bodies gave a definition of the notion of “religion” or of 
“cult”; moreover, these do not allow – a European magistrate noticed – for the 
identification of some general criteria according to which certain spiritual 
representations could be qualified as having the signification of a religion or of a 
cult” (Bîrsan, 2005, p. 709). 
In fact, we also encounter this reality in the text of the Constitutions of the 
European Union States. For example, the Constitution of Romania only expressly 
mentions two notions or syntagms: “religious faith” and “religious cults” (art. 29), 
without defining or specifying them from a notional or doctrinary point of view 
and, of course, the less so, without defining the criteria or the ground based on 
which the above-mentioned could be defined as such.  
The European jurists also recognise that “... being a follower of the great traditional 
religions is not prone to raising any problems with regard to the exercise of 
controlling if the freedom of religion is observed”, and that “the situation is 
however not the same for less-known religious movements” (Bîrsan, 2005, p. 709). 
In fact, the Commission of the Court of Strassbourg stipulated that the notions of 
“practice and observance” – used in the text of Article 9, paragraph 1 of the 
European Convention – “do not cover all the acts that could outline a certain 
religion or a certain faith” (Bîrsan, 2005, p. 710). Hence, the specification that this 
Commission wanted to make, namely that the term „religious convictions” is 
distinguishable from notions such as “opinions” or “ideas” (Bîrsan, 2005, p. 709). 
According to the statements of certain magistrates of the European Court, “the 
notion of “cult” regards the services practiced by the religious cults, no matter 
which they may be, irrespective of the number of believers who embraced them or 
of their geographical extent on the territory of a state” (Bîrsan, 2005, p. 714).  
However, the notion of (religious) Cult cannot be merely limited to the ritual of the 
prayers or services it involves, as it implies – as a sine qua non criterion of its 
organisational existence and of its legal functioning – three indispensable 
conditions: a) a Testimony of faith of its own; b) a well-defined ritual and c) an 
organisational structure, represented by its own governance bodies 
That only the existence of these three elements can give an intrinsical consistency 
and an exterior shape to a religious Cult also follows from a decision of the 
European Court, according to which “... the freedom of manifesting one`s religious 
convictions through certain practices cannot include statements...”, and, therefore, 
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such “statements”, even if they belong to a religious Community or to a religious 
Cult, “have nothing in common with faith, being mere manifestations of 
commercial advertising” (Bîrsan, 2005, p. 714). 
With regard to the religious convictions, which are in fact externalised through 
“practice and observance”, the latter also expressly referred to by Article 9 of the 
European Convention, the same Court stipulated that these practices and rituals 
“are peculiar of a certain religious behaviour... manifested through words or 
actions”, which is, in fact, “... externalised through the participation in religious 
services, processions or through the wearing of specific clothes” (Bîrsan, 2005, p. 
714). 
Among the various forms that the manifestations of a religion or of certain 
religious convictions can take, the European Court mentioned both „the ritual 
sacrification of certain animals”, on the occasion of some religious holidays, as 
well as “burials and the way cemeteries are set up”, which – in its conception too – 
“represent an essential element of religious practices” (Bîrsan, 2005, p. 715). 
The European Court, too, wanted to specify that a person can manifest “his 
religious convictions in many ways”, however not in the context of “the profession 
he practices”, but “outside of its field” (Bîrsan, 2005, p. 716). In fact, “... the 
European Court emphasized that, although art. 9 of the Convention allows for the 
fulfillment of acts of cult or devotion strongly tied to the personal convictions that 
can correspond to a certain religious belief”, this does not mean that the text always 
protect “the right to behave in the public sphere according to one`s faith” (Bîrsan, 
2005, p. 716). 
In the text of article 9 of the Convention, the Jurisprudence of the European Court 
outlined two components for each freedom (of thought, of conscience and of 
religion), namely an internal and an external one. The former finds expression in 
one`s inmost being, while the latter only emerges once with its external 
manifestation. “We are dealing - professor Corneliu Bîrsan wrote, a magistrate of 
the European Court “in illo tempore” - with two components of the same right, 
albeit each of them with its own juridical regime, a natural consequence of the 
circumstance that these liberties have both an internal character, related to the 
internal life of people, and an external one, represented by the people`s external 
manifestations, …”(Bîrsan, 2005, p. 705). 
Anyhow, the European Convention of the year 1950 has established no hierarchy 
of the three freedoms, “of thought”, “of conscience” and “of religion”, it only 
mentioned them in the order of their manifestation, both in „forum internum”, and 
in “forum externum”. 
As long as a religious faith – and, actually, a personal conviction, too – remain in 
one`s inmost being, they cannot be subject to any limitation. In fact, “any penalty 
imposed on a person merely on the ground that person have a faith, without having 
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manifested it in any way, cannot be accepted and cannot have any legitimate 
purpose” (Chiriţă, 2008, p. 526). As such, as long as a religious faith only manifest 
in one`s mind, it will only be part of one`s conscience, hence its relating to the 
freedom of conscience. 
To sum up, we want to stress that, with regard to the right to the freedom of 
Religion – provided by Article 9 of the European Convention – the European Court 
of Human Rights considers that religious freedom is related “first and foremost to 
the internal forum”, but also that “it equally involves the possibility to manifest 
one`s religion, not only collectively, but, to that, in the circle of those who share 
the same faith; each person can enjoy this freedom – the European Court concluded 
– individually or in one`s private life” (Bîrsan, 2005, p. 713). 
Therefore, in the conception of the European Court, it`s not only the traditional 
Churches or Cults or the ones with the most followers that can enjoy this right to 
religious freedom, but also the religious Groups which, in fact, next to the Cults 
and the religious Communities are also entitled by the laws of the E.U. States to 
organise themselves and to function under the law. However, as a magistrate of the 
European Court himself wanted to specify, the text of Article 9 of the European 
Convention “... does not protect every act that is motivated or inspired by a certain 
religion or (religious, n.n.) conviction; apart from that, the individual (sic), in the 
exercise of his freedom to manifest his own religion, can take his particular 
situation into account” (Bîrsan, 2005, p. 713). 
The small circle of the people who share the same religious faith can therefore also 
enjoy the right that the freedom of religion grants to the various forms of 
manifestation that a Religion or a religious Conviction can take, namely “... 
through worship, teaching, practice and observance” (Art. 9 of the European 
Convention). 
As the juridical protection provided by Article 9 of the European Convention is 
concerned, both the natural persons and the legal entities, that is the Churches, 
more exactly the religious Cults, can enjoy it. And, in accordance with the 
decisions of the European Court, “… a campaign led against a church or a religious 
group, mainly manifesting through injurious and denigrating attacks from the part 
of other persons can lead to the involvement of the state`s responsibility, on the 
grounds of art. 9 of the Convention, if its authorities refrain themselves from 
adopting the measures that could lead to the cessation of such a campain” (Bîrsan, 
2005, p. 703-704).  
The same jurisprudence of the European Court considers that “not only state 
authorities”, but also ”private persons are subject to the obligation to observe the 
freedoms protected through art. 9 par. 1 of the Convention” (Bîrsan, 2005, p. 704). 
In this sense, among these „private persons” there are also some journalists who 
not seldom get involved or become instruments of some obscurely directed 
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campains, with an injurious and denigrating character against the religious Cults, 
irrespective of their characteristics.  
As the freedom of expression is concerned, with regard to Religion and Morals 
(Dură, 2011, p. 158-173), “… the European Court emphasized the fact that neither 
could a uniform European notion of „Morals;...” (Bîrsan, 2005, p. 757) be derived 
from the internal law of the contracting States, nor that the EU States „have with 
regard to the protection of Morals a decisive and absolute power, that could 
undergo no European control” (Bîrsan, 2005, p. 758). 
This European control – materialised especially through the decisions of the 
European Court – usually examines the limitations, the constraints that the States 
make in the context of activities or public manifestations that underline their 
religious-moral implications. 
Not seldom has the European Court tackled the problem of examining and deciding 
also with regard to the relation between the granting of the freedom of expression 
and that of the freedom of religion, but we should recognise that its decisions 
weren`t always impartial. In fact, we could notice that, sometimes, the Court has 
acted as the defender of the freedom of expression to the detriment of the freedom 
of religion. For example, the Court decided that when injurious attacks take place 
“against some objects of religious veneration” (icons, crucifix, crosses etc.), their 
sanctioning „be proportional with the pursued aim” (sic), motivating that „one 
cannot give an exhaustive definition of what constitute „an acceptable 
infringement” of the right to the freedom of expression when the latter is exercised 
against the religious feelings of other persons” (Bîrsan, 2005, p. 758).  
However, the European Convention also provided limitations for the freedom of 
expression (acc. to Art. 10 § 2). For example, the European legislator provided that 
“the protection of the reputation or rights of others” (the European Convention, art. 
10 par. 2) belongs to those “restrictions” (acc. to art. 10 § 2) or „limitations” of the 
freedom of expression. In this sense, it rarely happened that the European Court 
imposed those “restrictions” or „limitations” to certain journalists who hurt the 
religious feelings of some members of the religious monotheistic Cults (Dură, 
Mititelu, 2007, p. 9-17), be they the traditional Christian ones (Orthodoxy and 
Roman-Catholicism), or the Mosaic or Islamic one. 
As regards the way to apply certain “restrictions” or “limitations” to the exercise of 
social freedoms, such as religious freedom, freedom of expression etc., the 
European Court recognises that the States who signed the European Convention 
dispose of a certain range of appreciation, which is however not “unlimited”. In 
fact, the Court declared that, in the last resort, “it is the mission of the European 
jurisdiction to ultimately pronounce upon the compatibility of the restrictions 
applied by the national authorities to the provisions of the Convention, while taking 
into consideration the circumstances of every cause, especially to see if they 
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correspond to a “...stringent social need” and if they are “proportional to the 
pursued purpose” (Bîrsan, 2005, p. 764). 
According to the jurisprudence of the European Court, the provision of the 
Convention, in Article 9, “... protects, above all, the field of personal convictions 
and of religious faiths. Moreover, it defends – in the conception of the European 
Court – the acts related to these behaviours, such as the acts of worship and 
devotion, as practical aspects of a religion or of some convictions, in generally 
acknowledged forms” (Bîrsan, 2005, p. 698).  
Therefore, in the interpretation of some magistrates of the European Court, “the 
personal convictions” and “the religious beliefs” are placed by the European 
Convention on a par. In fact, in their opinion, Article 9 of the European Convention 
for the protection of human rights (Rome, 1950) equally defends not only the two 
fields, but also their acts and practical manifestations. In this sense, the acts and 
manifestations of a religious faith – irrespective of its nature – cannot be merely 
reduced to the level of those following from a personal conviction, be it a religious 
one, because a religious faith is substantially and radically different from any 
personal conviction through its origin, through its nature, through its way of 
expression and manifestation, as the Cult of any Religion vividly certifies to us. 
From the text of the European and international regulations we can easily notice 
that the right to the freedom of religion cannot be dissociated from the right to the 
freedom of thought and of conscience and from the right to the freedom of 
expression (cf. art. 10 of the Convention), but also from the right to the freedom of 
peaceful assembly and association (cf. art. 11 of the Convention) and from the right 
of parents to ensure a religious education to their children (cf. art. 2 of the First 
Additional Protocol to the Convention) etc. 
Among other, the first “Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”, published in Paris in the year 1952, 
specified that “… in the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to 
education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such 
education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical 
convictions” (art. 2). 
In its Jurisprudence, the European Court has shown that “… the parents can 
pretend that the States respect their religious and philosophical convictions”, and 
that the verb “to respect” – in the text of article 2 of the Additional Protocol – 
signifies much more than „to recognise” or “to take into consideration” the parents` 
religious and philosophical convictions; beyond any negative commitment, this 
verb – “to respect” – implies, as a duty of the contracting states, „a certain positive 
obligation” (Bîrsan, 2005, p. 1070).  
As a matter of fact, Article 2 of the Protocol actually “forbids” the contracting 
States “to pursue an aim of indoctrination that could be considered not to observe 
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the parents` religious and philosophical convictions; …”. Also, „… the States are 
bound to ensure the observance of these convictions of the parents in the ensemble 
of the public education programs” (Bîrsan, 2005, p. 1071). 
In the perception of the European Court, the word “convictions” – in the text of 
Article 2 of the Additional Protocol to the European Convention – „is not 
synonymous with the terms “opinions and ideas”, as the term “convictions” – the 
Court`s Jurisprudence specifies – expresses „certain points of view that reach a 
certain level of force, of seriousness, of coherence and of importance” for a person 
or for a group of persons” (Bîrsan, 2005, p. 1072). 
The same jurisprudence lets us know that the expression “philosophical 
convictions” refers to those convictions that deserve the respect “of a democratic 
society, are not incompatible with the dignity of the person and, to that, do not 
appear to be in contradiction with the fundamental right to instruction, …”(Bîrsan, 
2005, p. 1072). 
In the interpretation of the European Court, the text of Article 2 of the Protocol “… 
does not hinder the states from disseminating, through education and teaching, 
information and knowledge which have an either direct or indirect religious or 
philosophical character, …” (Bîrsan, 2005, p. 1072). 
Hence, based on article 2 of the First Additional Protocol to the European 
Convention, in the exercise of the functions it assumes in relation to education and 
to teaching, the State shall, therefore, “respect the right of parents to ensure such 
education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical 
convictions”. 
Through the provision of the obligation of the EU States to respect “the right of 
parents” to ensure an “education” and a „teaching” according to “their religious 
and philosophical convictions”, in Protocol no. 1 it was actually recognised “a 
distinct right, the right of parents to decide with regard to the education of their 
children, no matter if they were the natural or the adoptive parents of that child” 
(Chiriţă, 2008, p. 805). 
Just as an competent Commentator noticed, with regard to the text of article 2 of 
the First Protocol to the Convention, its authors wanted the avoid the... “... the 
experience in the totalitary states where children were subject to indoctrination 
through the propaganda carried on in the educational institutions” (Chiriţă, 2008, p. 
806). 
In its decisions, the European Court specified that “the Teaching” that Article 9 of 
the European Convention refers to “does not regard school education; this one is 
protected by the provisions of art. 2 of the First Additional Protocol; …”, but it 
refers to “the religious education conceived as the possibility to abolish an activity 
of building up and disseminating a determinant cult” (Bîrsan, 2005, p. 714).  
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In other words, we are talking about an education with a preeminently religious 
character, expressed and provided in the spirit and the words of the teaching of 
faith of the respective Cult, whose final purpose would actually fit into an activity 
with a double aim: educational and missionary-religious.  
Regarding the right to disseminate the knowledge produced by this religious 
teaching in the form of a missionary activity, the European Court recognised that, 
in principle, the freedom to manifest one`s Religion also presupposes “… the right 
of trying to convince your fellow man, for example, through a “teaching”, because 
otherwise “the freedom to change his religion or conviction” – provided by article 
9 of the European Convention – “risk to remain dead letter” (Bîrsan, 2005, p. 714). 
In the conception of the European Court, the use of religious education with the 
purpose of convincing other people to adopt or to convert to your Religion is not a 
form of proselytism (Dură, 2010, pp. 279-290), but the natural result of the 
exercise of the right recognised by the European Convention in article 9. However, 
not all jurists or members of the religious Cults can accept this interpretation, as the 
reality confirms to us that through such a form of religious education, with a 
persuasive character and with a missionary-proselytistic tint, proselytism is actually 
tolerated under the protective mask of the freedom of Religion. 
In its decisions, taken on the basis of article 2 of the Additional Protocole no. 1 to 
the Convention, the European Court wanted to specify that this right of the parents 
was also recognised with the purpose of promoting a pluralism in education 
(Chiriţă, 2008, p. 806). At the same time, “the European Court specified the fact 
that the state`s obligation is not limited to the choice of the courses and subjects to 
be studied, but also involves the choice of the teaching methods meant for carrying 
on the pupils` education” (Chiriţă, 2008, p. 806).  
The European Court also noticed the right of some Christian States – such as, for 
example, is the case of Norway – to educate their children according to their own 
Christian histories and traditions. That is why the Court rejected as ungrounded the 
accusation of some of its citizens, of a different Tradition and Religion, that “... in 
the framework of the course of religion and philosophy, a great part of the 
curriculum is dedicated to the study of Christianity, a fact that cannot be sanctioned 
if we take into consideration the history and the Christian state tradition of 
Norway” (Chiriţă, 2008, p. 807). 
The same Court recommended that the respective School curricula promote an 
approach, an educational pluralism and a spirit of understanding, tolerance and 
dialogue. But, what could we say about the reality of our Countries, where the 
children in public School are still instilled the doctrine of the Darwinist 
Evolutionary theory and almost nothing about the doctrine of the Creationism 
theory?! 
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The European legislator wanted to impose on the contracting States the obligation 
to ensure the freedom of citizens to manifest their faith or their religious 
convictions without any direct or indirect constraint, except, of course, for „the 
restrictions provided by the law”, that are considered to be “necessary measures, in 
a democratic society, in the interests of public safety, for the protection of order, 
health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” (art. 9 of 
the European Convention on human rights). 
The practice of the European contentious instances has shown that „the juridical 
definition of the freedom of conscience does not seem easy. It has been shown that 
the freedom of conscience can neither overlap the freedom of opinion,..., nor the 
freedom of cult, which signifies the right of every person to openly exercise a 
certain religious cult, according to one`s faith; the freedom of conscience is 
situated – a magistrate of the European Court concluded – between these two 
freedoms” (Bîrsan, 2005, p. 707). And, though, we can notice that, “… in the 
Jurisprudence of the European Court, the freedom of conscience appears to be 
rather attached to the religious one…”(Bîrsan, 2005, p. 707). 
Indeed, the freedom of conscience can neither overlap “the freedom of thought and 
opinion”, nor “the freedom of religious faiths”, nor be identified with the latter and, 
of course, the less so ought the two liberties, namely of thinking and of religion, be 
included within the framework of “the freedom of conscience” – as they are 
mentioned in the text of article 29 of the Romanian Constitution – moreover, the 
latter should not be considered a corollary of religious freedom, or, even worse, be 
attached to the freedom of religion, as we encounter it in the Jurisprudence of the 
European Court. 
That for the magistrates of the European Court “the freedom of conscience appears 
to be rather attached to the freedom of religion and to the one related to the 
expression of one`s convictions, either alone or collectively, …”(Bîrsan, 2005, p. 
707), is confirmed by its resolutions themselves. For example, based on the 
resolution of the European Court, the obligation provided by the school Curriculum 
that, at School, the children also attend a Course of moral and social education “… 
is not an infringement on the freedom of conscience, as, in such a context, we are 
not talking about a political or religious indoctrination” (Bîrsan, 2005, p. 708).  
We should also emphasize the fact that the European Court, too, considers that the 
obligation of some servants of the Cults to join a Pension System bears no relation 
to the manifestation of a person`s religion or to his religious convictions and, as 
such, this “… does not represent an infringement on the freedoms granted by art. 9 
of the Convention” (Bîrsan, 2005, pp. 708-709).  
To that, the Court did not recognise “the existence of a right” for the persons who, 
out of reasons of conscience, refuse to fulfill their military service, including the 
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provision of “a service of public interest instead of these obligations” (Bîrsan, 
2005, p. 709). 
In this sense, through the above-mentioned decisions, the magistrates of the 
European Court prove, of course, that at times they also contradicted themselves 
with regard to their opinions, although they usually pronounced themselves 
decisively with regard to the right of any person to the freedom of Religion, 
including here the possibility to express one`s identity or religious status freely, to 
change one`s religion or religious conviction and even to make it known be it in the 
presence of a majority of another religious faith1.. 
With regard to their status of legal entities, the religious Cults should also enjoy the 
right to the observance of the inviolability of the home, the right to the protection 
of the secret of correspondence, the right ensuring the protection of the intimacy 
and of the reputation of their religious servants etc.  
Although Article 8 of the European Convention only offers protection to the 
private life, not to the public one, the European Court, though, admitted the fact 
that it`s not only the natural person who benefits from the right to the observance 
of the inviolability of the home and especially from the right to the protection of 
the secret of correspondence, but the legal entity, too, as religious Cults are. 
Actually, we should also mention that, among the clauses provided by the 
European Convention for allowing „the interference by a public authority with the 
exercise of this right”, it is also expressly mentioned “... the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others” (art. 8 § 2), which presupposes that “alterum non laedere” 
(Ulpianus). 
For the European Court, the conversations of a professional nature – including, 
therefore, the ones that also regard the servants of the religious Cults – are also 
considered to be “... like any private elements of a person. That is exactly why – a 
Romanian constitutionalist specifies – the Court expressly refused to offer a 
definition to the notion of private life” (Chiriţă, 2008, p. 420).  
In its decisions, the European Court specified that “… the right to the freedom of 
religion, in the sense bestowed upon it by the Convention, excludes any 
appreciation from behalf of the state with regard to the legitimacy of some 
religious faiths or the ways how these are expressed” (Bîrsan, 2005, p. 704). 
Therefore, in conformity with the decisions of the European Court, no state 
authority - no matter which it may be - is entitled to pronounce itself with regard to 
the legitimacy of a religious faith or of its way of expressing itself. 
                                                          
1 See, for a clarification, the text of the decision of the European Court in the Kochinos case (the 
Jehovians from Greece).  
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The European Convention on Human Rights (Rome, 1950) provided both the right 
of any person to the freedom “of religion”, and one`s “freedom” “to change one`s 
religion or conviction” (art. 9). 
A constitutive element of the right to the freedom of religion is indeed the right of 
the person to change his religion by free choice1, a freedom that should, however, 
exclude any form of religious proselytism (Dură, 2010, p. 279-290), which “… 
takes on the cloth of coercion or manipulation” (Stanomir, 2011, p. 45), and, 
implicitly, any form of privilege and discrimination in the religious politics of the 
EU States (Dură, 2009, p. 463-489). 
The UN International Pact regarding the civil and political rights, that entered in 
force on March 23, 1976, recognises also the right of any person “to adopt a certain 
religion” (art. 18, par. 2). Hence, any man has the right not only to change his 
religion, but also to adopt another religion. And, in this sense, through this 
international regulation, too, “the right to one`s religion” was reconfirmed at an 
international level, emphasizing, this way, the provision included in Article 18 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the year 1948.  
In its decisions, the European Court stipulated with the value of a principle that the 
right to the freedom of religion be also a “valuable good of atheists, agnostics, 
skeptics or indifferents” (Bîrsan, 2005, p. 709). In fact, its magistrates wanted to 
specify that, based on Article 9 of the European Convention, this right involves the 
freedom to follow a Religion or not, to practice it or not, or to change it. Of course, 
any atheist, agnostic, skeptic, free thinker etc. could become a believer one day, 
that is a follower of a religion. But to make the freedom of religion a “valuable 
good” also for the above-mentioned means either not to understand the origin, 
nature, content and finality of a religious faith, or to reduce it merely to an 
unconditioned right, that any man could benefit from. And, in our opinion, in this 
case, the magistrates of the Court have considered the latter version which, indeed, 
is plausible, because the right to the freedom of religion is first and foremost 
grounded on “Jus naturale” (Dură, 2013, p. 213-233), and only then in “Jus 
scriptum” or “Jus positivum”, be it either national or international. 
The same magistrates of the European Court consider that the persons with 
“pacifist ideas” should also enjoy the right to the freedom of thought and of 
conscience because, in their opinion, “… pacifism is included in the application 
field of the right to the freedom of thought and of conscience” (Bîrsan, 2005, p. 
715). Of course, any idea – be it also of a philosophical or juridical nature – is first 
of all the result of a freedom of thought that all people can benefit from, 
irrespective of their religious faith, of their philosophical, political conviction etc.  
                                                          
1 Cf. Art. 9 of the European Convention for the protection of human rights.  
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The examination of the text of certain decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights and of certain Comments made by its magistrates gave us the possibility to 
understand that we can also talk about a jurisprudence of the European Court with 
respect to the human right to freedom of religion. Of course, this jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights is a documentary source of reference not 
only for the experts in religious law – itself a part of the large field of European 
law – but also for the magistrates of the EU States, who are called upon to also 
pronounce themselves on matters which regard the human fundamental rights, 
among which the Right to the freedom of Religion. 
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